NECESSITY ………….the mother of invention and ingenuity

Necesse est Ingenii mater

Fellow Gunners

I recently attended the funeral of Gnr Evert Benson; and afterwards at the traditional Gunner wake, raised a toast to Gnr Benson at the Artillery School. Such events usually leave me somewhat dispirited. The inevitability of it all, is pervasive and, hangs on one. So, in this frame of mind, I rode rather slowly out of The School.

Driving through the open-air artillery museum, one gun caught my attention. That gun was the G3 Gun. I started pondering on the origins of this gun, from a South African perspective. What in fact was its raison d’ etre? There and then I decided to do some background research into the G3 Gun, and by necessary extension, the G4, G5 and G6 Guns. The reader needs to understand and appreciate that there is quite a lot of material available on this weaponry. As such, the writer will endeavour to capture the essence of the saga, yet not lose the thread, or the theme.

That South Africa needed new and more modern guns was already mooted and identified as far back as 1968. It is incorrect to believe that Operation Savannah (1975) was the genesis of South African artillery requirements. What is correct however, post Savannah, was the fact, that there was a critical need to obtain suitable ordinance that was of equivalence to and if not better than the Russian Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs); and medium artillery, the D30s.

It was against this backdrop, that the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, and Armscor got together to devise an interim plan whilst the official development and testing of our own artillery equipment was being rolled out. Overall, the programme upgrade was to last more than 30 years. The one major requirement at that stage was that any gun acquired would have to be capable of a range of at least 24,000 meters. This, in order to counter the Soviet – supplied weaponry. As far as possible, the advent of a wider conventional threat, had to be contained as much as possible. This threat was recognized by the South Africa Artillery in 1974. It needs to be borne in mind that the development of military systems is both a time- consuming and an expensive endeavour. Both budgetary and embargo constraints were the countervailing winds that S.A. Artillery planners had to contend with at the time.

It would be remiss of the writer not to mention the names of the senior S.A. Artillery Officers who were the original driving force behind the development of our modern era ordinance.

They are:
General Frans van den Berg (deceased)
General Paul Lombard
General Joffel van der Westhuizen

All three had first hand knowledge and experience of what was required. One might say that they were, ‘The boots on the ground’, for the project (known as Boas). General Joffel van der Westhuizen was the G5/G6 Project Officer from 1976 to 1981.

Some perspective is needed here. The maximum ranges of our guns at that time:

  1. G1 (88mm) – 13,400 yards (12,252m).
  2. G2 (140mm) – 16,196 yards (14,809m).

Compare this to the opposing Russian equipment:

  1. 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launcher – (20,740 yards) (18,965m) (capable of launching 40 rounds).
  2. 122mm D30 (field howitzer) – (16,830 yards) (15,300m).

Small wonder then that South Africa had to up the ante, and quick. So, in stepped ‘Necessity – the mother of invention and ingenuity’. So, in the words of Col Herman van Niekerk, ‘One morning we woke up and at the unit lines, we found these monstrosities on the parade ground. There were 6 massive guns behind Magirus Deutz gun tractors’.

These ‘monstrosities’ were in fact M59/M2 155mm American guns bought from Space Research Corporation (SRC) (A Canadian Company), together with 3300 projectiles. This equipment was originally adopted in 1938 and used by the Americans during WWII. This gun had a barrel length of 275 inches and 45 calibres.

A little bit of algebra:

x(calibres) x 155mm = 6975mm (barrel length), So, x = 6975 ÷ 155 = 45 Calibres Note 6975mm = 275 inches. This in fact was the G3 Gun (using S.A. Artillery nomenclature). Crucially the maximum range of the M59 (G3) was 25,700 yards (23,500m).

The G3 was never used in action, but were tested on the General De La Rey Range outside Potchefstroom. However, they were used for gun drill purposes. Col Div de Villiers was in charge of the first G3 course. The G3 was not suitable for Southern African conditions – they were too unwieldy and were difficult to handle and manoeuvre.

The next phase involved the obtaining of M68/M2 (G4) Guns. These were also aptly named Long Toms. The G4 (Tampella/Soltam M68) ordinance was a 39 calibre howitzer and was not suited to Southern African conditions. Two problems: the horizontal sliding breech would trap dirt and lose its obturation capability, and the guns were too low for the ‘middelmannetjie’ on the Angolan roads/tracks. Gun tractors could not drag the guns and burned-out clutches. Also, the wheel track (of the gun) was narrower than that of the gun tractors. These guns were originally designed for a SP chassis – the towed version was an S.A.-unique gun.

As can be seen things were starting to happen. The artillery was forced to modernise – this in keeping with their supporting role to both mechanized or armoured formations. Mobility was key and our military doctrine and was modelled largely along Israeli Army lines. As the motto goes: ‘Mobilitate Vincere’.

With a buffer of the G4 Guns in place, the S.A.D.F. could set about the acquisition and development of our more modern ordinance – this in order to counter any ordinance that the enemy might offer up. This was the advent of the G5 and G6 Guns, as we know them.

For information purposes, the reader needs to bear in mind that any modern artillery equipment would have to be ‘created’ around the following features:

  • The system would have to be moved rapidly over long distances (Pretoria to Grootfontein is 2,000 kilometres by road) and would need to be airlifted in a C-130 Hercules. Therefore, the physical size and weight were critical.
  • The climate of the operational area varied from hot, wet summers to cold, dry winters.
  • The systems would have to operate in dense bush and between tall trees. This meant that the howitzers (high angle) would need to travel and deploy over short distances without the use of their gun tractors and would, therefore, need their own power and transmission systems.
  • The mud and dust of the operational area would cause a high attrition rate in moving parts and, in particular, breech mechanisms would need to be simple and robust.
  • Furthermore, this new howitzer would be firing at far higher charges than existing 155mm equipment and would need a far stronger recoil system than that currently available.

It goes without saying that the above requirements were portended on our unique South African geology, geography and climate conditions.

What to the writer’s mind, also ‘propelled’ the urgent need for the upgrade was the pivotal Battle of Bridge 14, during Operation Savannah. The words of Lt. General Joffel van der Westhuizen, sums up the situation very succinctly, “My colleagues and my artillery life had a ‘before and after Savannah’ character. Before Savannah, the South African Artillery [Field Branch] found itself as an extension of the Royal Artillery, and our drills, equipment, procedures, and even our traditions were British-based. We were primarily a supporting arm for the infantry and armour. In November 1975, 14 Field Regiment, of which I was the OC, stood on Angolan soil. For the first time since World War II, we fired our trusty old G1 and G2 Guns in anger at an enemy. Against our guns [were] the 130mm medium gun (M46) and the 122mm rocket launcher [the ‘red eye’].

And exactly because of this to-and-fro firing, our lives in the artillery made an about-turn and the British yoke and blinkers bit the dust. We learned with unbelievable speed that the S.A. artillery can fight independently and aggressively, whilst it must still be prepared to provide fire support to the infantry and armour. At the same time, it must be able to protect itself and especially its gun crews. Later, we even deployed a single gun well forward, engaged the enemy and withdrew before they could shoot back. Actually, guerrilla tactics with a gun.”

It is said that when you’re walking on a tight rope, you tend to focus.

As they say, ‘Boer maak ‘n plan’. With the embargo and sanctions gaining momentum, the

S.A.D.F. had to resort to ‘gun-running’ tactics. Given our local lack of capability (at the time) to produce these new generation guns, it was decided to utilise the services of The Space Research Corporation (S.R.C.) in Canada and to industrialise and deliver G5 Guns to South Africa by March 1978.

From here on in things started taking on proportions that any writer of spy novels would have gladly have loved to get his hands on. Central to the saga (and it had many moving parts) was Dr Gerald Vincent Bull of S.R.C. Dr Bull was a Canadian engineer with a penchant for long-range artillery. He was also a formidable personality, if not enigmatic. In 1977 and 1978 he orchestrated the illegal sale of 30,000 155mm artillery shells, gun barrels and plans for

the GC-45 howitzer, as well as equipment to Armscor. Shipments were made through St John’s; New Brunswick; Antiqua as well as through Spain. This, fellow Gunners, is how the G5 came to land on South African shores, albeit that the equipment was painted in that familiar ‘agricultural yellow’ colour, and made to look like, well…………………. agricultural equipment (Sic!). Note that the G6 Gun is a G5 Gun mounted on a six-wheeled chassis.

Some G5 specifications:

Type: 155 mm gun/howitzer

Weight: 13,5 tonnes

Crew: 8

Dimensions: length (towing configuration), barrel turned back, 9,1m; height 2,3m

Mobility: 10t gun tractor, towing speed 90km/h on roads and 50km/h on dirt; self-propelled by 68hp auxiliary diesel engine allowing speeds of 3 to 8km/h

Elevation: +75º to -3º

Traverse: 84º with elevation below 15º, 65º above 15º

Range: 3000m minimum; 30,000 maximum with stand:

Rate of fire: 3 rounds/minute for 15 minutes, then 2r/min (barrel heating)

Calibre: 45

Ammunition: High explosive (HE) (45,5Kg), HE base bleed (47kg), smoke, illumination, white phosphorous. The HE rounds contain 8,7kg of explosive and their casings release between 3032 and 4756 fragments.

From 1978 onward all manufacturing of the G5 and G6 Guns was done in South Africa – Lyttleton Engineering Works.

The first three G5 Guns were handed over to Captain I.R. Johnson of 142 Battery on 21 May 1982. Thereafter training and testing on these guns started in earnest. Then on a day (in the Northern Cape) a test G5 Gun was brought into action, loaded with a M57 base bleed projectile and Charge 3. The round landed 39,600 metres from the gun position – South Africa went into the record books.

The G5’s operational debut was in August 1986 around Cuito (Operation Alpha Centauri). The guns were issued to PBTY at 4 SAI.

As for Dr Bull (The name is Bull    Dr Gerald Bull), he found himself in all sorts of trouble for illegal arms dealing, and was locked up for 6 months in an U.S. Federal Penitentiary. He was also fined US $55,000 for illegally selling details on extended range shell development to the Chinese.

On 22 March 1990 Dr Bull was shot and killed outside his Brussels apartment. Whether it was Mossad or The C.I.A., no one knows?

However, one looks at it, and to quote Machiavelli, ‘The end justifies the means’. Since 1982 the G5 Gun is still the staple for many countries around the world. It is truly a formidable weapon, and well worthy of its place, as an indelible feature of our Gunner Colours.

The final phrase of the ‘War that never was’, played out on the plains of southern Angola, at a little African village by the name of Tchipa. A combined S.A.D.F. – UNITA force was holding line at Cuito Cuanavale. On the 26-27 June 1988, the G5 Guns unleashed all hell on Tchipa and the blood flowed at Tchipa. Ranged against the S.A. Task Force was the overwhelming 50th Cuban Division, supported by the formidable MIG23 fighter jet. This force, that was moving steadily south-eastwards to Calueque, was continuously and constantly, being held in check by the S.A. Artillery. Then at midnight on the 27th June 1988, Cmdt Mike Muller (Commander 61 Mech Battalion) received orders to cross over into S.W.A. under the cover of darkness.

This engagement at Tchipa heralded the last fighting between the South Africans and the combined Angolan – Cuban force in the war for southern Angola. On 27th June 1988 all hostilities closed.

In closing it is worth considering the words of Stalin, ‘Artillery is the god of war’. In Stalin’s view, artillery was the most crucial weapon in warfare . . . It still is.

Non nobis rationem quaerere’
(Ours not to reason why)

Gunner Greetings Collin Hyman

18 February 2025

Note: In my reading and research on the G3 Gun et al there were many actors. In order to keep the ‘flow’ of the story going, and as brief as possible, I have had to omit quite a few personalities and facts. Hope you understand. No innuendo intended.

References/Bibliography:

  1. ‘Born to Storm’ – Herman van Niekerk.
  2. ‘First In Last Out’ – The South African Artillery in Action 1975-1988, Clive Wilsworth. (Above article premised mainly on this work).
  3. Article by Lt. General Joffel van der Westhuizen – dedicated to Dr Gerald Bull (the father of the G5). Quoted in ‘First In Last Out’.
  4. Weapons and Warfare – Artillery, Jeff Kinard.
  5. South African Armed Forces, Helmoed – Romër Heitman.
  6. ‘Eye of the Firestorm’ – General Roland de Vries.

Source: Gunner Clive Wilsworth